Summary
The article is written as response to Dr. Kursany’s article about the concept of New Sudan. I will argue that the use of the fiscal policy to compare the Sudan of the 60s with that of the 90 is not enough if not suitable. The article discuss also the development of the concept of the New Sudan. Although the concept is very new in the Sudanese politics but its development can be traced back through the last fifteen years. The emergence of the New Forces and the new generations are the main driving forces for a New Sudan.
As Kursany said: The post independence era has been characterised by severe struggle between its social forces and the political organs. Of course its the outcome and the results of this struggle which has been ignored or neglected and seldom debated by the Sudanese intellectuals. Yet, the outcome is not a sheer sectarian or either intellectual. The result is a shift in power, loss of control over the prime mover that drive the forces of struggle towards the reality of the last fifteen years and on. The genesis of the idea of New Sudan can be traced through the history of the struggle mentioned above. And the delivery of the “New Sudan” is still at its earlier stages of labor. A question to be asked here why a New Sudan? What has happened with the old one? to answer those questions I will elaborate on some concepts that entered the dictionary of the Sudanese politics and as an introduction to my argument for a New Sudan.
Immediately after the Intifada two new concept had been introduced in the political rhetoric language of the Sudanese politicians, namely the “sadana or sadanh” and the “New Forces”. The former refers to those who were participated in or supported the political apparatus of May regime. The later is controversial and defined according to where one stands from the now forces. Before the elections the sectarian political parties regarded the New Forces as the graduates of the universities and other high schools. To accommodate the New Forces in the political organ, mainly the parliament, the number of seats for the graduates has been increased. The results after the elections showed that both the SCP and the sectarian parties has nothing in the New Forces. Turabi and his followers won the first round. After the series of strikes which were arranged by the trade unions, Sadig and his government got the notion that the New Forces are in fact the trade Unions. In the left, the SCP saw the New Forces as part of the class struggle, but instead of speaking of classes and mainly the proletariat strive to control the power and rule - classes has been reduced to categories. For the SCP the New Forces are the workers’ trade unions, students, farmers and women. This kind of categorization has been also used earlier by the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) -the single political party that functioned as the primary political apparatus of the May regime - under the name “al-tanzimat al-fi’awia”. Those include, The Sudanese youth union, Sudanese women’s union, the alliance of workers and farmers, intellectuals, national capitalists and soldiers. The main idea behind the introduction of the model of “al-tanzimat al-fi’awia” is to absorb and keep under control the power of the New Forces at least for a time. Several attempts has been tried to introduce the agenda of the SSU through this kind of categorization in the universities, schools, clubs and governmental institutions.
If one put himself in the situation of the political parties one will realise that in fact it is very difficult to identify those New Forces. The programmes and the agenda of the political parties has failed to attract the new generations. In addition to this, and the most important is that party politics seemed unable to solve problems of economic development and the war in the south.
With the same political figures that proved to be unable to tackle the chronic problems of the Sudan sine the post-independence up to date, the call for a New Sudan is justified. Those who call for a New Sudan are those who has been disappointed in the political parties and tired from showy politics. Thus the use of term by the Umma, DUP and SCP is only as a hollow slogan that may bring them to the chair of rule and back to the old games of rat and cat. Using the term just keep them hanging on.
Strange enough, the political movement in the southern part of the Sudan was not regarded as part of the New Forces by any definition. As always southerners were regarded as backwarded, uncivilised, underdeveloped, uneducated, mutineers and all the worst. Nothing “new” can come from the South. At first the SPLM called for secession of the south as a solution for the problem of the South. But after 1986 and with the take over of the extreme right over the rule in Khartoum the SPLM appealed for the Sudanese that the problem is not the problem of the south but that of the center and the whole Sudan. It is a problem of injustices, ignorance and oppression practiced by the center. And for the SPLM, all kind of political systems, ideologies and agendas that existed in the center since the begging of this century belongs to the old Sudan. This of course include the alliance of today, mainly the Umma, SCP and DUP. The main task for the southern political movement has been transformed radically by the SPLM from a movement being driven by the cause and consequences of the mutiny of 1955 on a regional basis to a revolutionary and nationalistic movement seeking solution not only for the south but the whole country for New Sudan. For the SPLM the New Sudan “is a concept strives to establish a new cultural order in the country. It takes as point of departure the notion that human beings, in any given society, have equal rights and obligations regardless of color, etc. The establishment of the new cultural order demands of necessity or radical restructuring of state power to establish genuine democracy and to follow the path of development that will lead to far-reaching social changes” (Bulletin issued by SPLM on February 1989).
Still Sudan is governed by the same faces since its independence without success or positive political or socio-economic development. And still the same faces want to rule further without any right. Political leaders are changing only positions and political party names. Defectors are mixed with the Sadanah, communist with Islamists and democracy activists with dictators. The role of the state is undermined, not because of the forces of globalization but because of lack of constitutionalism and the rule of law. Sudan entered in a viscous circle of showy democracy and unavoidable military hegemony. A conflict in the country harvested more than one million lives and destroyed the natural and human resources of the country. This is only few of the features of the old Sudan that are challenging for the New Forces for their strive for a real political change and a New Sudan. With this background about the need for a New Sudan I will argue further that the use of the fiscal policy (in this case the exchange rate of the national currency and the foreign reserves of the country) as basis to compare the old Sudan and New Sudan is not enough if not unsuitable measure for a number of reasons which I will mention below. I will not discuss the model of the New Sudan of this government because enough has been written about how much the country is underdeveloped and bad governed under its rule.
If we use the exchange rate as an argument to how a political system is good or bad and thus to conclude that the Old Sudan is better than the New then the argument should continue as follows: The colonial government before the independence is better than the first democratic regime, Aboud era is better than the second democratic period, The 25th of May regime is better than the third democratic rule and This government is better than the last democratic era. But I think its not as simple as this. The economic crisis of the country escalated at the end of the 1970s as any developing country in Africa. The crisis are in fact a result of the development path chosen since independence. After the 1970 we observed a decline of the industrial output, a deterioration of overall growth performance and productivity, low prices of agricultural commodities, a decreasing saving capacity and declining investments rates, low wages, increased imports with high prices etc.. With the introduction of the structural adjustment programmes governments were advised, among others, to devaluate their currencies to the real values. As a result the exchange rates of the national currency increased by more that 10000 folds since the independence. At one hand this can be attributed to the function of the global market and at the other to inappropriate economic policies over a long time administered by the country’s native politicians which the world bank (1990) better described as a “constancy of policy failure in Sudan”. Parallel to this escalating economic crisis the political crisis started to gain momentum even before the 1970 and continued up to date.
The consequences of this economic and political policy of the old Sudan is an increasing poverty , structurally malformed economical system, chronic civil war and social unrest. All this necessitate a radical change of the political system and the economic policies that persisted sine the independence . Thus the high exchange rates of today do not imply the old Sudan is better and at the same time the Sudan of today is not the New Sudan that the majority are dreaming about.
There is a fundamental difference, I think, between the model of the New Sudan promised by the NDA in general and that of the SPLM and SAF in specific. Some of the NDA members are fundamental constituents of the old Sudan political system and have already used their cards. This is what create a sort of skepticism and suspicious around the New Sudan concept. And that is why the leaders of the NDA do not want to go further with the concept of New Sudan other than a secular state. The issue of secularism is only a hollow slogan and touches only the separation of the state from religion but never how to go about this separation. Secularism is the carrot for the horse to keep the struggle against Fundamentalism. As far as I know the SPLM and SAF have a clear ideas on the concept of the New Sudan. They want to have a Sudan that can accommodate all the diversity of the country; a real democracy where all people have the rights to chose how they want to be ruled and who showed rule; They want to have justice ,freedom, equality and rule of law; They want to develop the country socially and economically; they want to put an end to the South-North conflict; they want to keep the country united and powerful. Time-out for old Sudan politics.
Abu McNimmir
(Publihsed in May 1998)
